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Abstract
This paper investigates China’s banking system in a post-crisis environment, 2008-
2018, focusing on determinants of bank lending. We use a panel of 14 Chinese listed
banks, for which there is data over this period. We group these 14 banks into various
bank-clusters, classified by ownership and systemic importance. Possible determinants
of loan growth are divided into two sets of variables: bureaucratic variables and economic
variables. We find that for individual banks and bank groups bureaucratic variables are
very significant and the economic variables have comparatively little influence, which is
consistent with the state retraining quite a lot of control. However, pooling of the data
gives evidence for the influence of economic variables. The size of the coefficients is
similar to the average of the individual banks but they are now significant, reflecting the
larger sample size. Thus the pooled estimates are more supportive of the role of bank-
specific market forces in determining loan growth.
JEL classifications: E51, P34, C32
Keywords: Loan growth; Listed banks; Bureaucratic effects; Market effects; China
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the determinants of bank lending in China in a post-crisis environ-
ment, 2008-2018. We conduct a heterogeneous panel analysis of a panel of 14 Chinese listed
banks, for which there is data over the period 2008Q1-2018Q4. These 14 banks represent a
large share of China’s banking financial system. We group them into various bank-clusters,
classified by Chinese government categories and global systemic importance.
Under a market system loan growth responds to stochastic economic shocks to demand
and supply and tends to follow a random walk like path, similar to many other financial vari-
ables, within regulatory constraints. Under planned systems loan growth is much more pre-
dictable. A comparison of the sterling exchange rate with renminbi exchange rate will show
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the difference. In the case of the banks, the planning controls include plan targets, credit
restrictions and loan quotas. The possible determinants of loan growth are divided into two
sets of variables. The first set, we label bureaucratic variables. These include deterministic
elements like trends, seasonal effects and dummies representing state directives during the
crisis plus a lagged dependent variable reflecting inertia or slow adjustment. The second set
we label economic variables. These include bank-specific economic factors that in a mar-
ket system one would expect to influence loan growth. The economic variables we consider
are suggested by the US bank regulators financial conditions measures usually summarized
as CAMEL: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management capability, Earnings and Liquidity,
plus some other variables like bank size. We find that for individual banks and bank groups
bureaucratic variables are very significant and the economic variables have comparatively
little influence, which is consistent with the state retraining quite a lot of control. However,
pooling of the data, which constrain the coefficients to be the same across banks within a
group, gives more evidence for the influence of economic variables. The size of the coeffi-
cients is similar to the average of the individual banks but they are now significant, reflecting
the larger sample size. Thus the pooled estimates are somewhat more supportive of the role
of bank-specific market forces in determining loan growth. However, the bureaucratic vari-
ables remain important.
China’s banking financial institutions accounted for 78% of total financial assets in 2008
and 83% in 2018. Commercial banks are the main part of Chinese banking financial institu-
tions and their total assets occupied 78% of the banking financial institutions in 2018, and is
therefore a pivotal part of China’s financial system. Chinese commercial banks rely on tra-
ditional investment tools, predominantly lending, which reached 52% of their total assets in
2018. The evolution of bank lending is hence clearly at the core of recent Chinese financial
development. So this paper investigates the determinants of loan growth for 14 listed Chinese
commercial banks over the period 2008-2018, the decade after the financial crisis.
China initiated a series of far reaching financial reforms in 1978 in an attempt to trans-
form gradually from a government-controlled financial system to a market-based financial
system, which lets the market play decisive role in resource allocation. The main purpose of
these reforms has been to increase competition, enhance stability, and improve the perfor-
mance of the Chinese banking sector; and indeed, competition has increased significantly
(Tan & Floros, 2018). As far as the reforms of the financial system are concerned, three im-
portant aspects of financial institutional changes are: (i) the reform of the banking system;
(ii) the exchange rate reform; and (iii) the rapid development of the capital market (Zuo &
Park, 2011). Given the importance of banking to the Chinese economy, reforms of the bank-
ing system took a centre stage in the wider reform effort to achieve China’s transformation
to a market economy. This included the development of a multi-tiered banking system of
private and state-owned banks from the pre 1978 banking system, where lending was fascili-
tated through the People’s Bank of China only. In investigating determinants of bank lending
in China we hence give an evaluation of the state of this development thus far. The rapid
development of China’s financial system implied rapid loan growth. There is a debate as to
whether this loan growth is justified by market forces or a result of state interventions, which
goes to the core of arguments on sustainability of the Chinese banking system. We investigate
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this issue.
A crucial function of a financial system is its ability to withstand shocks. Open, market
based systems are vulnerable to financial market disruption: Lack of control and intercon-
nectedness of market participants can lead to rapid transmission and amplification of ex-
ternal shocks. The financial crisis of 2008 and following gave an example of unusually large
disruption to global financial markets. It was therefore a test to China’s developing financial
system. Disruptive effects to the global financial system transmitted in large part through
bank lending: Across the world the failure of traditional bank-lending channels of monetary
transmission prompted the implementation of unconventional monetary policies, such as
quantitative easing, by major central banks. Investigating Chinese post-crisis bank lending
has important implications for the stability of China’s financial system, which in late 2019
was an important policy question.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present a literature review in Sec-
tion 2. We described particularly about the 14 Chinese listed banks in Section 3 this paper
focuses. We describe the data and variables in Section 4. We discuss the empirical methodol-
ogy and results in Section 5. Section 5 presents the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
While there is a large literature on the determinants of international bank lending, concerned
with distinguishing the external (foreign "push") and internal (domestic "pull") factors, (e.g.
Jeanneau & Micu, 2002; De Haas & Van Lelyveld, 2006; Gozgor, 2014; Iwanicz-Drozdowska
& Witkowski, 2016), it is not very relevant for Chinese domestic lending. China’s banking
system is highly controlled by government and banks’ lending behaviour follows the lead of
government. Similarly, there are a number of studies of the determinants of credit growth
in panels of countries which regard China as an observation in their samples, for instance,
Takáts (2010) and Gozgor (2014). However, studies including China as an observation ignore
the heterogeneity across countries.What is true from other economies and groups of coun-
tries may not be true for China.
Another part of the literature is concerned with distinguishing the demand and supply-
side factors driving loans growth. Some variables, e.g., lending interest rate, inflation, debt
overhang and alternative funding, are usually treated as factors affecting credit demand. Some
other macroeconomic variables, e.g., real GDP, unemployment, wages, economic sentiment
index, stock exchange, etc. However, it is often difficult to separate macro variables into
demand-side or supply-side factors. For example, real GDP drives credit cycles through both
supply and demand channels. We focus on bank-specific variable driving loan growth. These
variables, such as bank size, capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, liquidity and funding,
will reflect both demand and supply side macroeconomic forces.
The large literature emphasizing the central role of the government on Chinese banking
is particularly relevant to our analysis. Firth et al. (2009) point out that a salient characteristic
of China’s banking sector is the dominant state ownership of banks, which allows for govern-
ment involvement in the decision making of those banks, and policy lending remains a defin-
ing characteristic of the banking system. Liu et al. (2018) point out that the banking system in
3
China is mostly controlled by the government, and the Chinese capital market and credit sup-
ply expansion provide an excellent environment which cannot be replicated in other coun-
tries. Firms in China are more bank dependent, which makes them much more sensitive to
changes in bank loan supply. Liu & Wray (2010) argue that domestic Chinese banks really do
follow the lead of the government, — when encouraged to lend, they do so; when lending is
discouraged, they impose self-constraint. Bailey et al. (2011) state that China’s banks remain
largely constrained by government intervention at different levels and subject to substantial
political influences. Zhang & Daly (2011) argue that the government influences the banks’
lending behaviour by controlling the amount of lending through quotas and other means
to some degree, for example, state-owned banks (policy banks and "big four" state-owned
commercial banks) are the major lenders of state-owned enterprises. The SOEs make up a
substantial part of the national economy in China (Xu, 2010). So far China’s financial system
is still a typical "financial repression": banking is at the core of China’s financial system; what
makes things worse is that most banks are state-owned banks; China’s interest rate has been
regulated; and China’s stock market is still highly regulated (Liu, 2014).
Ru (2018) examines effects of government-directed lending on firms using detailed in-
dustrial loan data from China Development Bank (CDB) and finds that CDB industrial loans
to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) crowd out private firms in the same industry but crowd in
private firms in downstream industries. Liu et al. (2018) examine effectiveness of the govern-
ment oriented economic stimulus package and the associated increase in bank loans supply
by using a panel of Chinese firms over the period 2003-2013 and find that SOEs received more
bank loans and resources than non-SOEs. Cheng & Degryse (2010) investigate whether fi-
nancial development affects local economic growth, and they find that bank development, in
particular bank credit, greatly contributes to province growth. There are also research explor-
ing loans allocation in China from the standpoint of banks making loan decisions or from the
standpoint of firms accessing loans. For example, Firth et al. (2009) examine how the Chinese
state-owned banks allocate loans to private sectors and they find that the banks use commer-
cial judgments to make loan decisions and political connections play a role in gaining access
to bank finance. Other examples of research on loans allocation are Cull et al. (2015) and
Dong et al. (2016). In addition, for the case of banks in China, some researchers focus on
studying determinants of banks’ low profitability (García-Herrero et al., 2009); relationships
of bank profitability with inflation and economic growth (Tan & Floros, 2012); determinants
of banking efficiency (Chen et al., 2005); bank ownership reform and bank performance (Lin
& Zhang, 2009); determinants of financial performance (Heffernan & Fu, 2010).
There is also a literature examining the effect of bank lending. Liang & Cao (2007) in-
vestigate the time series relationship between property prices and bank lending in China
over the period 1999Q1-2006Q2 by using an autoregressive distributed lag framework and
find that there only exists unidirectional causality running from bank lending to property
prices. Pan & Yu (2008) study empirically the impact of local government intervention, legal
enforcement, and financial weakness on the bank loans of the state-owned listing companies
controlled by provincial government, and they find that the legal enforcement and financial
development at the province level have negative impact on bank credit and debt maturity.
Liu & Wray (2010) explore the effects of excessive liquidity on bank lending in China and they
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think that it is not excessive liquidity that creates the skyrocketing domestic loan growth.
Huang et al. (2015) explore how the bank loans and local amenities explain Chinese urban
house prices and he point out that credit drives up property prices after 2008 financial cri-
sis, whereas house prices only influence bank lending before crisis. Mixed results have been
obtained because of differences in research perspectives on loans determinants in China,
theoretical frameworks, econometric estimation methods, and dataset.
The ties with government vary across bank groups. The government intervenes in various
ways including credit quotas, monetary policy, window guidance, etc. Thus it is difficult to
measure government intervention. Therefore, many researchers just simply attributed loans
growth to government decisions. However, we think that even though the government lend-
ing policies dominated, the banking institutions can have some freedom to make decisions
according to market rules. Even though government sometimes makes specific lending de-
cisions for banks, it generally shows lending directions macroeconomically and it does not
intend to control loans in detail. Especially, the Chinese government has been implementing
a series of financial liberation reforms in recent years.
There is overwhelming evidence for other regions and countries that bank-specific fac-
tors play an role in determining loans growth. The determining factors of credit fluctuations
detected varied across studies, depending on sample and data period. Everaert et al. (2015)
analyse demand and supply factors (including bank size, asset quality, financial leverage in-
dicator, liquidity, capital adequacy, and profitability indicator) driving credit cycles in the
Central, Eastern, and south-eastern Europe (CESEE) countries by focusing on a large sample
of bank-level data on credit growth. Their results of panel data analysis indicate that supply
factors, on average and relative to demand factors, gained in importance in explaining credit
growth in the post-crisis period. Both CESEE countries and China have undeveloped finan-
cial market, but they are quite different in economy size, party and capitalist systems. It is not
easy to compare studies about CESEE countries with China. Pham (2015) empirically inves-
tigates possible factors including capital requirements, bank profitability, bank asset quality
and bank concentration, which drive domestic credit across 146 countries at different levels
of economic developments. They find that credit supply is negatively related to capital re-
quirement, exchange rate, index of capital account openness, bank concentration and non-
performing loans; they also find evidence of the country specific effect of economic growth
on bank lending; the determinant role of several variables such as inflation, global liquidity,
ROE/ROA index on explaining bank credit growth was also explored. There are some recent
studies on drivers of domestic credit expansion based on individual countries. Awdeh (2017)
investigates causes of credit growth in Lebanon by proposing a panel estimation equation in-
cluding a set of internal (bank-specific variables including growth of customer deposits, eq-
uity to asset ratio, loan-loss-provision, return of assets, and bank size) and external variables
(factors reflecting economic environment and developments). The panel data is based on
34 commercial banks over the period 2000 to 2015. Awdeh (2017) finds that deposit growth,
GDP growth, inflation, and money supply positively contribute to bank credit to the resi-
dent private sector. In contrary, credit risk, lending interest rate, T-bill rate, public borrowing,
and remittance inflows decrease loan growth. The impact of one-year lag of each variable
was also studied. Tan (2012) explores the determinants of the growth of private sector credit
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in Philippines and they find that relatively high net interest margins have been a significant
deterrent and deposit expansion also contributes positively to private credit growth, while a
larger bank size, bigger bank capitalization, foreign ownership, high overhead costs and pres-
ence of corporate taxes all positively contribute to higher net interest margins. These studies
show evidence that bank-specific factors play a role in loans growth, but their research results
are mixed across regions, sample period, definition of variables, control variables, research
methods, etc. In addition, these studies usually include both bank-specific and macroeco-
nomic variables in their models. China is quite different from other regions in country size,
economic and political systems, and it will make sense to study bank-specific variables on
the basis of balance sheets.
With this background, this study will systematically focus on identifying determinants of
China’s loan growth on the basis of panel data.
3 The state of China’s banking system
This section gives an introduction to Chinese banking institutions, particularly the sample of
14 listed banks with data since the financial crisis.
At the end of 2018, there were 4588 banking financial institutions operating in China,
including 6 large commercial banks (Postal Savings Bank of China joined in 2018), 12 joint-
equity commercial banks, 134 city commercial banks, etc. In the same year, there were 46
banks listed on Chinese stock exchanges; we focus on the 14 of them, listed before 2009, to
allow for long time series. There were 3 others listed in 2010, and the other 29 listed after 2013.
On the basis of classification standard of Chinese government, our sample includes 3 groups
of banks: 4 large state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), 7 joint-equity commercial banks
(JSCBs), and 3 city commercial banks (CCBs) (see Table 1). Since 2011, the Financial Stability
Board has published a list of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Our sample in-
cludes 3 G-SIBs: Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China; and 11 other banks which are not global systemically important banks (G-SUIBs).
The following shows details of these banks (see Table 1).
Our sample has 4 of the 6 large state-owned commercial banks, which include 3 of the
traditional "big four" state-owned commercial banks: Bank of China, China Construction
Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China,1 and Bank of Communications. Large state-
owned commercial banks are directly controlled by the state (Ministry of Finance and Cental
Huijin Investment Co., Ltd.), which is the first majority shareholder. Zhang & Daly (2011)
describe a large degree of government influence on the "big four" state-owned commercial
banks. These banks further dominate the banking financial institutions in terms of assets
share, capital source, network distribution, and stability. Their total assets comprises 36-51%
of banking financial institutions each year from 2008-2017 (see Figure 1). Generally, State-
owned banks are guaranteed by the Chinese government and enjoy a high reputation and
much social resources. Their relative monopoly position allows them to capture a large mar-
ket share in terms of assets outstanding. They run various and balanced business all over the
1Our sample does not include Agricultural Bank of China, which was listed the Shanghai Stock Exchange in
2010.
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country including major cities and most rural areas. Their strong and stable customer base
gives them a big advantage in terms of stability of lending and deposit. Of the six large com-
mercial banks in China, the four included in our sample account for 82-83% of total assets
each year from 2008 to 2017.
Our sample also has 7 of the 12 joint-equity commercial banks, which includes 5 state-
controlled banks which are SOEs: Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Hua Xia Bank Co.,
Ltd., China Merchants Bank, Industrial Bank Co., Ltd., and China CITIC Bank; and 2 non-
state-controlled banks, which are private-owned enterprises (POEs): Ping An Bank Co., Ltd.
and China Minsheng Banking Co., Ltd.. The joint-stock commercial banks run business
mainly in large and medium-sized cities and a few county areas. They implement manage-
ment differentiation strategy, provide unique services, and gradually form their own compet-
itive advantage. Their market share measured by total assets ratio in the banking financial
institutions has increased from 14% in 2008 to 18% in 2017 (see Figure 1). Of the 12 joint-
equity commercial banks in China, the seven included in our sample account for 80-84% of
total assets each year from 2008 to 2017.
Table 1: 14 listed banks.
crossid
Stock
code
Bank name
Chinese
classification
Sytematic
importance
Listing time
1 601398 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited SOCB G-SIB 27/10/2006
2 601939 China Construction Bank SOCB G-SIB 27/10/2005
3 601988 Bank of China SOCB G-SIB 01/06/2006
4 601328 Bank of Communications SOCB G-SUIB 23/06/2005
5 000001 Ping An Bank Co., Ltd. JECB G-SUIB 10/03/1989
6 600000 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank JECB G-SUIB 23/09/1999
7 600015 Hua Xia Bank Co., Ltd. JECB G-SUIB 12/09/2003
8 600016 China Minsheng Banking Co., Ltd. JECB G-SUIB 19/12/2000
9 600036 China Merchants Bank JECB G-SUIB 09/04/2002
10 601166 Industrial Bank Co., Ltd. JECB G-SUIB 23/01/2007
11 601998 China CITIC Bank JECB G-SUIB 19/04/2007
12 601169 Bank of Beijing CCB G-SUIB 19/09/2007
13 601009 Bank of Nanjing CCB G-SUIB 19/07/2007
14 002142 Bank of Ningbo CCB G-SUIB 19/07/2007
Note 1: SOCB refers to the state-owned commercial bank; JECB refers to the joint-equity commercial
bank; and CCB refers to the city commercial bank. G-SIB refers to the global systemically important
bank and G-SUIB other banks.
Note 2: We got information of sample banks from CSMAR (the China Stock Market Series and the
China Listed Firms Research Series), websites, the 2015 Annual Report of China Banking Regulatory
Commision, China Financial Development Report (2016; 2017), and the 2017 Annual Report of China
Banking Regulatory Commission.
Our sample also includes 3 of 134 city commercial banks including Bank of Ningbo, Bank
of Nanjing, and Bank of Beijing. Bank of Ningbo ranks first in the list of city commercial
banks (over 300 billion yuan in assets) in the competitiveness evaluation report of China’s
commercial banks released by The Banker in 2018. City commercial banks were founded
gradually since 1995 on the basis of urban credit cooperatives. They mainly offer financial
services for local middle and small enterprises and residents. Generally, they supply financial
services at provincial level although some have broken regional restrictions. City commercial
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banks have diverse ownership. Most city commercial banks have strong ties to their local
government and are majorly or wholly state owned.2 Even though the government is not the
largest holder of some city commercial banks, the local government is de facto in control.
The market share of city commercial banks has increased from 6% in 2008 to 13% in 2017. Of
the 134 city commercial banks in China, the three included in our sample account for 14-16%
of total assets each year from 2008 to 2017.
Figure 1: Market (assets) share of banking financial institutions in China, 2008-2017.
Source: The 2017 Annual Report of China Banking Regulatory Commission.
Generally, the number of each type of banking financial institutions is not proportional
to its market share. Even though the 14 sample banks occupy only a very small portion of all
the 4588 banking financial institutions in terms of the number, they all are the main banking
financial institutions with large assets.3 The total assets of population of large commercial
banks, joint-equity commercial banks, and city commercial banks is 169.5 trillion Yuan at end
of 2017, and it is 67.15 percent of the total assets of all financial institutions. The total assets
of 14 sample banks takes account of 46.52% of that of all financial institutions. Therefore,
regarding the market share of banks in the population of banking financial institutions, the
selected banks are representative of the total population of banks.
2Banking in China, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banking_in_China.
3Rural commercial banks, rural cooperative banks, rural credit cooperations, and village banks have a large
population number of 3822, but they usually have a very low market share.
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4 Data
As noted in the introduction we distinguish bureaucratic and economic variables. The bu-
reaucratic variables, representing government planning, are deterministic variables like trend,
seasonals, and dummy variables for crisis regulations plus a lagged dependent variable to
represent inertia. The economic variables are discussed below.
4.1 Economic determinants using CAMEL framework
In this paper, our interest lies in the loan growth of 14 listed Chinese banks. We obtain bank-
level data over the period 2008Q1-2018Q4 from CSMAR (the China Stock Market Series and
the China Listed Firms Research Series).4 We also collected additional information online.
The dependent variable in our models is loan growth, which is the percent change of net
loans and receivables at quarterly rate. Net loans and receivables is the monetary value of
outstanding loans and discounted assets receivables after deducting the provision for im-
pairment at the end of period. We use the CAMEL framework, which was recommended by
the U.S. Federal Reserve, to suggest the explanatory variables, reflecting five areas of financial
conditions for a financial institution: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management capabil-
ity, Earnings and Liquidity.5 CAMEL is set out in Table 2, together with the proxies that we use
to represent each variable. There is an element of judgment in how one chooses to measure
each element in CAMEL and different authors choose different variables. Our choice is not
exactly the same as used in the United States. We also add bank size which was suggested to
affect loan growth.
Table 2: CAMELS variables.
CAMEL Variable Abbr. Unit
Expected
sign
Dependent variable Growth of Net Loans and Receivables NLG 1
Capital Adequacy Ratio of Equity to Assets ETA 1 +
Asset quality
Ratio of General Risk Reserves to sum of General Risk
Reserves and Net Loans and Receivables
GRRTTL 1 +
Management Net Profits per Employee NPTEMP RMB +
Earnings Return on Equity ROE 1 +
Liquidity Ratio of Cash to Assets CTA 1 +
Ratio of Deposits Due To Customers to Total Assets DCTTA 1 +
4Dungey & Osborn (2019) cited: although there is considerable debate in the literature about the quality of
Chinese data, Sinclair (2013) shows that the extent of data revisions is comparable to those for the US; and sim-
ilarly, Chow (2006) finds official China data to be at least reasonably accurate and are reliable for use in many
macroeconomic analyses. The assigned staff members are obligated by law to prepare accurate statistics.
5In 1995 the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency replaced CAMEL with CAMELS,
adding Sensitivity to Market Risk. Sensitivity to market risk is a complex and evolving measurement area, and it
primarily to address interest rate risk, the sensitivity of all loans and deposits to relatively abrupt and unexpected
shifts in interest rates. Given no available data for individual bank’s interest rates for the whole period, 2008Q1-
2018Q4, we do not include this in our paper.
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In the following, we discuss how CAMEL variables may influence the dependent variable,
loan growth, and the expected sign of impacts is shown in Table 2.
4.1.1 Capital adequacy
Capital adequacy is measured as equity to assets ratio. Equity is the money that investors
have put into the banks (by buying its stock). It is a potential form of funding (Brinkmeyer,
2015). The equity to assets ratio measures a bank’s capital adequacy and indicates a bank’s
leverage (debt). More specifically, it measures the degree to which a bank is financing its
operations through debt versus wholly-owned funds. It reflects the ability of shareholder to
cover all outstanding debts in the event of a business downturn.
A high ratio implies the bank is well capitalized and relies little on debt to run its business.
Relying too heavily on debt, the bank has to make more interest payments, weakening its
financial position and making it vulnerable to a bank run, at which point it won’t be able to
pay out deposits. Bank loan is a major part of domestic credit. De Lis et al. (2001) find that
episodes of strong credit growth tend to go hand in hand with large increases in equity in a
sample of industrial countries. This ratio is expected to be positively related to loan growth.
Everaert et al. (2015) assess capital adequacy of banks by ratio of equity to net loans and
they find that capital adequacy in the previous year has a positive effect on real annual credit
growth in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.
The capital adequacy is hence expected to have a positive effect on loan growth of Chi-
nese banks.
4.1.2 Asset quality
Researchers use the ratio of loan loss reserves (memo) to gross loans to measure asset qual-
ity, which indicates how much of the total portfolio has been provided for but not charged
off (Kosmidou et al., 2005; World-Bank, 2006; Everaert et al., 2015). Loan loss reserves are
accounting entries banks make to cover estimated losses on loans due to defaults and non-
payment. Given data availability, we use the ratio of general risk reserves to the sum of general
risk reserves and net loans and receivables to measure asset quality of a bank. General risk
reserves refers to the risk preparation that a bank extracts from the net profit to make up for
the unrecognized potential loss.
Chinese banks assess the potential risk of some risky assets using their own developed
models based on the principle of dynamic provision, or by the government requirements.
Dynamic provision refers to the counter-cyclical provision method adopted by banks accord-
ing to the changes of the macroeconomic situation. That is, when the default rate of the risky
assets is relatively low in the upward macroeconomic trend, banks make more reserves to
increase financial buffers. When the default rate of the risky assets is relatively high in reces-
sions, banks make less reserves and use the accumulated provisions to absorb asset losses.
Loans are the major asset for most banks. So the ratio of general risk reserves to the sum of
general risk reserves and net loans and receivables measures the asset quality, particularly
loan quality: the higher the ratio, the less risky assets, the better the quality of the assets in-
cluding the loan portfolio.
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Asset quality is hence expected to have a positive effect on loan growth because lending
is inversely related to risk (Altunbas et al., 2007; Nier & Zicchino, 2008).
4.1.3 Management
Management influences whether a bank possesses the ability to correctly diagnose and re-
spond to financial stress. The category depends on the quality of the business strategy, finan-
cial performance areas, and internal control measures. In the business strategy and financial
performance areas, it refers to the institution’s plans for the next few years, including the
capital accumulation rate, growth rate, and identification of the major risks. Internal con-
trol measures refers to the its ability to track and identify potential risks. Examples includes
information systems, audit programs, and record keeping.
Management is measured as net profits per employee. In CAMEL model studies, Soni
(2012) use total debt to total deposits, profit per employee, ROE, and earnings per employee
as indicators of management of a bank. Rostami (2015) uses net profit, total assets, total
liabilities, total deposits, and total loans of number of branches of each bank. Given the def-
initions of management, strong correlations of indicators employed by researchers and data
availability, we use net profits per employee to measure management.
Net profits per employee is expected to have a positive effect on loan growth of Chinese
banks.
4.1.4 Earnings
Earnings are measured as return on equity. Return on equity is equal to net profits divided
by balance of shareholders’ equity, which measures how profitable a bank uses its capital. It
provides a solid indicator of earnings and profitability performance of banks and is a very ef-
fective metric for evaluating and comparing banks. ROEs of 15-20% are generally considered
to be favorable for purposes of investment.6
A higher profitability is a signal of a general improvement of economic conditions. A
higher return on equity indicates that a bank is effectively using its capital to generate prof-
its and return the profits to investors at an attractive level. From this point, a higher return
on equity can attract more equity and then a bank have a higher capital adequacy which is
expected to have a positive effect on loan growth. Low profitability may signal fundamental
problems for insurance corporations and may be considered as a leading indicator for sol-
vency problems (Heath, 2013), which we think also works for banks. Intuitively, banks will
conceivably lend more as their profitability increases.
Return on equity is expected to have a positive effect on loan growth of Chinese banks.
6See Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040815/what-level-return-equity-common-
company-banking-sector.asp
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4.1.5 Liquidity
Liquidity is measured as ratio of cash to assets. We use information from Financial Dictionary,
Investopedia, and the Economic Times to understand liquidity of a bank.7 Liquidity is the
ability of a bank to pay its debts using only its liquid assets. A liquid asset can be easily sold
or converted into cash to meet financial obligations on short notice at little or no loss of its
value. Funds in checking, cash in banking accounts and marketable securities, such as stocks
and bonds, are the most common types of liquid assets for all businesses including banks.
So, ratio of cash to assets is an indicator to reflect the degree of a bank’s assets liquidity.
Higher available liquidity in the preceding period is expected to facilitate greater credit
expansion (Everaert et al., 2015). High liquidity implies that the bank has a good ability to
pay its debts. However, it does not mean that, the more liquid assets a bank has, the more
benefit it gets. In the operation of banks, they try to expand loans and investments for profit.
Meanwhile, banks are required to keep enough liquid assets to pay its debts to avoid the
accumulation of liquidity shortfall. Liquidity shortfall can trigger banks’ operation risk and
even risks in the financial system.
Because lending is inversely related to risk, liquidity measured by cash to assets ratio is
expected to have a positive effect on loan growth of Chinese banks.
4.1.6 Funding situation
We use the ratio of total customer deposits to total assets as a measure for a bank’s funding
situation. This ratio measures what percentage of total assets is supported with customer de-
posits. Customer deposits refers to savings deposits except due to banks and other financial
institutions, which is a insured funding. Short-term funding includes deposits from banks,
and other deposits and short-term borrowings, which is uninsured funding. The share of
customer deposits in total assets captures the insured funding, while the share of short-term
funding in total assets captures the uninsured funding (Brinkmeyer, 2015). Insured funding
is relatively cheap and rise of insured funding decreases a bank’s cost. Customer deposits is
the least expensive funding source for a bank.8 A higher share of customer deposits means a
better funding situation, which might promote bank loans.
A better funding situation of a bank is expected to increase the loan growth.
4.1.7 Bank size
We control for banks’ size, using total assets of a bank over total assets of the 14 sample banks.
The share of total assets of a bank shows the position of the bank in the banking sector (Micco
& Panizza, 2006; Iwanicz-Drozdowska & Witkowski, 2016).
Many researchers measure bank size on the basis of a bank’s total assets, but their spe-
cific technologies are different. De Haas & Van Lelyveld (2006) use the portion of a bank’s
7Financial dictionary, http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/liquid+asset. Investopedia,
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/052515/what-difference-between-banks-liquidity-and-its-liquid-
assets.asp. The Economic Times, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/liquid-asset.
8See the Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (2018):
http://investors.cryolife.com/static-files/6ef9d21c-da5c-4d7e-9bba-70c04f8f4612.
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total assets in the total assets in the banking sector in a particular country to measure bank
size, which is similar to our measurement. There are also researchers who measure bank
size by taking the natural logarithm of total assets (Chen & Wu, 2014; Altunbas et al., 2007;
Brinkmeyer, 2015; Kim & Sohn, 2017). Everaert et al. (2015) treat bank assets-to-GDP (bank
size) as a explanatory variable of credit growth and find that larger banks grow more slowly
than smaller ones.
Altunbas et al. (2007) find that bank size seems to be important as large commercial banks
appear to be less risky than their smaller counterparts and bigger efficient and inefficient
banks also seem to have lower loan loss reserve levels. So, it seems that larger banks have
higher loan growth. Banks with a small share may lend aggressively to increase their market
stake. On the other hand, banks with a high market share may enjoy their ‘monopolistic’ posi-
tion and impose their conditions on the credit market. So Iwanicz-Drozdowska & Witkowski
(2016) believe that the influence of the share of a given bank on its credit growth may be non-
linear and, most of all, that it is rather the ‘category’ (e.g., small or quasi-monopolistic) that
matters, not the share in quantitative terms. Kim & Sohn (2017) argue that the expected sign
of bank size on lending activities is ambiguous. According to the "too big to fail" theory, Kim
& Sohn (2017) argue that, large banks have incentives to take more risk amid high expecta-
tions of government bailout to prevent systemic risk, thereby enabling supply of more credit.
However, large banks can diversify their portfolio by investing in various types of securities
and involving themselves in various activities, whereas small banks tend to pursue traditional
lending activities. From this perspective, the bank size effect can be negative.
So there is so far no consistent finding about the size effect, but current research shows
that bank size makes some difference for loan growth. The effects of bank size on loan growth
is expected to depend on the relative strength of its positive and negative effects.
4.2 Data description
Table 3 and 4 present the mean and standard deviation of the variables, which reflects finan-
cial conditions of banks, over the period from 2008Q1 to 2018Q4. Figure 2 and Figures 3-10 in
the appendix show the patterns of variables. The financial conditions vary across banks and
groups of banks.
Comparing bank groups classified by Chinese standard, on average, state-owned com-
mercial banks are the largest and have the lowest loan growth (3.25%). This is in line with
state-owned commercial banks having the lowest general risk reserve ratio, net profit per
employee, as well as liquidity measured by cash-to-assets. State-owned commercial banks
have the highest capital adequacy and a good situation with respect to their insured funding
measured by the share of customer deposits in total assets. State-owned commercial banks
rely on traditional investment (loans) and funding instruments (customer deposits). For all
variables excluding ROE and bank size listed in Table 4, state-owned commercial banks shows
stability in terms of their smallest standard deviations among three bank groups. Joint-equity
commercial banks have an average loan growth of 4.35%. On average estimates for joint-
equity commercial banks are in between large state-owned commercial banks and city com-
mercial banks for all variables, excluding that joint-equity commercial banks have the lowest
capital adequacy and highest ROE. But they display the highest standard deviation for ROE
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and share of customer deposits in total assets. City commercial banks, which are smaller
than the other banks, have the highest loan growth (5.64%), as well as general risk reserves
ratio, net profit per employee, and lead in terms of liquidity. But City commercial banks have
the lowest ROE with a small standard deviation and insured funding share. Standard devi-
ations for city commercial banks’ loan growth, capital adequacy, general risk reserves ratio,
net profit per employee, and cash-to-assets, are the highest among all bank groups.
Comparing global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) with other banks, G-SIBs have,
on average, lower loan growth (3.2%), general risk reserve ratio, net profit per employee, and
poorer liquidity. G-SIBs have higher average capital adequacy, ROE, and share of customer
deposits in total assets and bank size. Tn terms of standard deviation, G-SIBs shows more
stability for every variable excluding bank size listed in Table 4.
Looking at graph 2 for the 14 banks, we generally observe a downward trend and, as well
as seasonal patterns, and substantial outliers for loan growth during the global financial cri-
sis. An exception is Ping An Bank Co., Ltd., which shows a spike in a different time, 2011Q3.
The sharp loan growth in these years is associated with the government oriented economic
stimulus package after financial crisis (Liu et al., 2018). This state intervention can be seen
as an example of a planned or bureaucratic pattern, that does not respond to short term eco-
nomic variables. Generally descriptive analysis, shows a lot of movement in other variables,
that do not seem to be related to loan growth. Examples for this are big movements in capital
adequacy and big jumps in general risk reserve between 2012 and 2013. In 2012, the Ministry
of Finance of the P.R. China increased general risk reserve balance requirements from 1% to
1.5% of the ending balance of risky assets from July 2012 (it should not be lower than 1% be-
tween July 2005 and June 2012.), which is phased in over 5 years for financial institutions. This
is why the general risk reserve proportion has jumps. We include a dummy for this jump in
general risk reserve but it has not significant effect on loan growth. There are strong season-
ality in management variable (net profit margin per employee) and earning variable (return
on equity) and small seasonality in other variables. Cash-to-assets ratio moves around quite
a lot. This raises a question about how much influence the economic variables have on loan
growth. So looking at the graphs, we see a fairly simple deterministic pattern in loan growth
despite a large variations in the economic variables that are would expect to influence loan
growth. This suggests that the planning process may be the main influence. These are based
on graphs, we need to look at the regressions.
Table 5 illustrates the correlation matrix between variables from 2008Q1 to 2018Q4. All
the correlations are smaller than 0.5 excluding: the correlations of general risk reserve ratio
and customer deposits to assets, and of ROE and net profits per employee.
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Table 5: Correlation coefficients, pooled data for 14 banks.
NLG ETA GRRTTL NPTEMP ROE CTA DCTTA BS
NLG 1 -0.15 -0.23 -0.28 -0.29 0.04 -0.10 -0.18
ETA -0.15 1 0.26 0.16 -0.19 -0.20 -0.05 0.32
GRRTTL -0.23 0.26 1 0.38 -0.11 -0.33 -0.64 -0.18
NPTEMP -0.28 0.16 0.38 1 0.63 -0.01 -0.33 -0.21
ROE -0.29 -0.19 -0.11 0.63 1 0.09 0.13 0.07
CTA 0.04 -0.20 -0.33 -0.01 0.09 1 0.08 -0.22
DCTTA 0.10 -0.05 -0.64 -0.33 0.13 0.08 1 0.49
BS -0.18 0.32 -0.18 -0.21 0.07 -0.22 0.49 1
Figure 2: NLG: Loan growth at quarterly rate.
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Net Loan Growth (NLG)
Note: The number at top of each subgraph corresponds to the crossid of each bank listed in Table 1.
5 Research methods and results
The objective of our analysis is to determine the extent to which the loan growth of Chinese
banks reflects government intervention or market forces as reflected in the bank specific de-
terminants discussed above.
As noted above the government intervenes in various ways including credit quotas, mon-
etary policy, window guidance, etc. Thus it is difficult to measure government intervention.
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Therefore, many researchers simply attributed loans growth to Chinese government deci-
sions. However, we think that even though the government lending policies make differ-
ence, the banking institutions can have some freedom to make decisions according to mar-
ket rules. Even though the state sometimes intervenes through specific lending decisions
for banks, it typically gives lending directions macroeconomically and does not intend to
control banks’ lending operations in detail. We use some variables that we will label bureau-
cratic variables to represent possible government actions plus some bank specific variables
that we will label economic variables. We will then ask about the respective contribution of
these two sets of variables. The bureaucratic variables include deterministic elements like
trends, seasonal terms and dummies representing state directives during the crisis plus a
lagged dependent variable reflecting inertia or slow adjustment. The economic variables in-
clude bank-specific economic factors that, in a market system, one would expect to influence
loan growth. Economic variables considered follow the CAMEL approach outlined above.In
choosing our model we will answer: Which variable should be included in the final model
specifications; how many lags should be included; and how much heterogeneity is there in
the banks and groups of banks?
Our baseline model has a vector of independent variables, xi , which are either current
or lagged one period to reduce the endogeneity, plus the lagged dependent variable to allow
for any slow adjustment. For the homogeneous slope model we employ fixed-effects within
estimators. The homogeneous slope current economic variables model is
N LGi t =αi +β
′
xi ,t +δ
′
D9Q(q)+ρDB511Q3
+σ′@SE AS(q)+φ@T RE N D+γN LGi ,t−1+ vi t .
(5.1)
N LGi t is the dependent variable, loan growth; xi t gives a vector of economic variables in-
cluding equity to assets (ETA), general risk reserves to total assets (GRRTTA), net profits per
employee (NPTEMP), ROE, cash to assets (CTA), customer deposits to total assets (DCTTA),
and bank size (BS); D9Q(q), q = 1,2,3 capture outliers in loan growth in 2009Q1, 2009Q2, and
2009Q3, respectively; DB511Q3 captures the outlier in loan growth of Ping An Bank Co., Ltd.
in 2011Q3; @SE AS(q), q = 1,2,3 capture seasonal effects; @T RE N D is a trend term; αi is a
vector of bank specific constants vi t is an error term. β
′
is a vector of coefficient of variables
xi ,t , δ
′
of D9Q(q), ρ of DB511Q3; σ
′
of @SE AS(q), φ of @T RE N D , and γ of N LGi ,t−1.
The homogeneous slope lagged economic variables model is
N LGi t =αi +β
′
xi ,t−1+δ
′
D9Q(q)+ρDB511Q3
+σ′@SE AS(q)+φ@T RE N D+γN LGi ,t−1+ vi t .
(5.2)
The heterogeneous slope lagged economic variables model involves estimating the model
for each individual bank:
N LGi t = ηi +β
′
i xi ,t−1+δ
′
i D9Q(q)+ρi DB511Q3
+σ′i @SE AS(q)+φi @T RE N D+γi N LGi ,t−1+ vi t .
(5.3)
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5.1 Pooled fixed effects panel regressions
5.1.1 Homogeneous model specification
We explain loan growth with the variables suggested by the CAMEL approach as well as bank
size and bureaucratic variables. We start using a general specification of 7 variables, which
we subsequently reduce to 4 economic variables following a stepwise selection procedure
and economic analysis. Models are re-evaluated throughout the selection procedure using
information criteria, tests for omitted variables, and economic judgment.
Table 6 shows fixed effects panel estimations. The general fixed effect specification (GEQ1)
includes all variables illustrated by the homogeneous slop current economic variables model
(5.1): 7 economic variables plus 3 seasonals, a trend, 3 dummies and a lagged dependent
variable. The specific specification (SEQ1) gives a specification obtained after stepwise drop-
ping least significant variables until all variables are significant. Both information criteria,
Akaike info criterion (AIC) and Schwarz criterion (BIC), suggest the specific specification
SEQ1 rather the general specification GEQ1.
There may be reverse causality from loan growth of banks onto economic variables. To
address this endogeneity, we used lagged values of economic variables. Our dynamic gen-
eral model (5.2) therefore contains the 7 economic variables lagged by one quarter plus 3
seasonals, a trend, 3 dummies and a lagged dependent variable. The specific specification,
SEQ2a, gives a specification obtained after stepwise dropping least significant variables un-
til all variables are significant excluding lagged loan growth and the constant.9 Comparing
model specifications, SEQ1 and SEQ2, AIC prefers the homogeneous lagged economic vari-
ables model and BIC the current economic economic variables one. Once we drop the in-
significant lagged loan growth from the lagged economic variables specific model (SEQ2a),
BIC turns to suggest the lagged economic variables model.
Whilst the preceding variable selection was purely based on econometric criteria, we se-
lect homogeneous lagged economic variables specification, SEQ2b, as baseline specification,
by applying further analytic judgment: Net profit margin per employee on loans growth is
dropped despite its significance, given an effect size that is approximately zero. We are fur-
ther interested in evaluating the effects of liquidity on loans growth and hence include cash
to assets ratio in the specification SEQ2b although it is insignificant.
5.1.2 Results
Based on homogeneous lagged economic variables specifications, bank lending is signifi-
cantly affected by a combination of economic and bureaucratic variables. Strikingly, the
combined impact of economic variables out-sizes that of deterministic factors by roughly
a factor three. Effects of equity and risk reserves ratios are particularly strong and positive as
expected. In the homogeneous current economic variables specifications economic factors
turn largely insignificant, apart from ETA, which has a relatively large effect on bank lending,
albeit only weakly significant.
9Although lagged loan growth is insignificant in the lagged economic variables model. We retain it, so we can
compare between specifications.
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Table 6: General to specific estimations, coefficients. Dependent variable: NLG; Method: Fixed Effects
Panel Least Squares.
Regressor GEQ1 SEQ1 Regressor GEQ2 SEQ2a SEQ2b
ETA 0.223* ETA(-1) 0.547*** 0.543*** 0.510***
GRRTTL -0.344 GRRTTL(-1) 0.733*** 0.687*** 0.588*
NPTEMP -6.57E-09 NPTEMP(-1) -1.88E-08*** -2.21E-08***
ROE 0.028 ROE(-1) 0.145** 0.123*** 0.131*
CTA -0.051 CTA(-1) 0.036 0.035
DCTTA 0.016 DCTTA(-1) 0.014
BS 0.140 BS(-1) 0.001
C 0.011 0.038*** C -0.028 -0.007 -0.020
@SEAS(1) 0.019** 0.019*** @SEAS(1) 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.015***
@SEAS(2) 0.010* 0.008*** @SEAS(2) 0.015** 0.011*** 0.021***
@SEAS(3) 0.000 @SEAS(3) 0.003 0.006*
@TREND -0.0002 -0.0004*** @TREND -0.0005** -0.0006*** -0.0006***
D9Q1 0.113*** 0.112*** D9Q1 0.108*** 0.107*** 0.110***
D9Q2 0.070*** 0.068*** D9Q2 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.072***
D9Q3 0.009 D9Q3 0.013* 0.013* 0.014**
DB511Q3 0.319*** 0.320*** DB511Q3 0.322*** 0.324*** 0.320***
NLG(-1) 0.024 0.056* NLG(-1) 0.037 0.036 0.037
R2 0.65 0.65 R2 0.67 0.66 0.66
MLL 1416.40 1411.22 MLL 1426.33 1424.76 1423.31
AIC -4.716 -4.729 AIC -4.749 -4.758 -4.753
BIC -4.492 -4.572 BIC -4.526 -4.564 -4.559
DW 1.94 1.99 DW 1.94 1.95 1.94
Note 1: GE indicates the general model. SE indicates the specific model. First block current economic
variables and second block lagged.
Note 2: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
5.2 Heterogeneity in the banks and groups of banks
5.2.1 Sample selection and model specification
Preceding results give fixed-effects estimates that are pooled for all 14 banks. This allows to
control for unobserved heterogeneity in intercepts, whilst taking advantage of the full sam-
ple of observations available. But large degree of heterogeneity across banks can result in
biased pooled estimates. We therefore estimate the heterogeneity across estimates explicitly
in models for individual banks (see Table 8) on the basis of the baseline specification SEQ2b.
We further cluster banks with similar characteristics groups, which gives more efficient esti-
mates whilst avoiding some of the bias present in the pooled panels (see Table 8). Table 10
in the appendix shows diagnostic tests for the baseline general specifications, which suggests
these specifications for the individual banks are reliable.
Banks are clustered along two dimensions: Chinese groups distinguished mainly by the
government (large state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), joint-equity commercial banks
(JSCBs), and city commercial banks (CCBs)) and global groups by systemic importance (global
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systemically important banks (G-SIBs), and others (G-SUIBs)). The pooled general model
uses the usual standard errors. If White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used,
they are larger and only ETA(-1) is significant at the 10% level.
We compare models based on sums of information criteria for individual banks and bank
groups. Given the loss of efficiency as we reduce sample sizes, we employ further stepwise
elimination of insignificant variables, which further reduces parameters and retains compar-
atively high degrees of freedom (see Table 9). Results suggested in the model selection stage
are ambiguous (see Table 7): For the baseline specific models, the AIC and BIC both suggest
individual bank as samples. For baseline general models, BIC prefers samples clustered by
global groups, whilst AIC again indicates individual banks. The information criteria reflect fit
as measured by Log likelihood and parsimony as reflected in the number of parameters. BIC
penalizes the number of parameters more and hence reflects the difference in sample size to
a greater extend. Moving from baseline general to specific models for individual banks means
that there is a large reduction in the number of parameters from 183 to 83, for the Chinese
bank groups from 53 to 39, and for the global groups from 40 to 32. Given this large differ-
ence in parameters applied to relatively small samples, we tend to err on the side of model
parsimony and regard the choice indicated by BIC as more reliable.
Table 7: AIC and BIC
Baseline general specifications Baseline specific specifications
MLL k BIC AIC MLL k BIC AIC
Fixed effects panel of 14 banks 1423.91 27 1337.82 1396.91 1423.91 27 1337.82 1396.91
Individual banks 1775.03 183 1191.56 1592.03 1760.35 83 1495.72 1677.35
Chinese groups 1500.77 53 1331.79 1447.77 1520.48 39 1396.13 1481.48
Global groups 1468.16 40 1340.62 1428.16 1491.47 32 1389.45 1459.47
5.2.2 Results
Given the further reduction in considered covariates, we report results for baseline general
and specific models separately. Results are given in tables 8 and 9, respectively.
5.2.2.1 Baseline general models Table 8 gives results for regressions on individual banks
and bank groups using baseline general specifications. Results are similar to general specifi-
cations for pooled estimates. Most significant effects are through deterministic terms, partic-
ularly the first seasonal dummy, SEAS(1), and the first crisis dummy, D9Q1, which indicates
a significant degree of state intervention affecting lending growth. This notwithstanding we
find significant effects of bank specific market factors for clustered bank groups. The state
intervention could be explained by the 4-trillion-yuan stimulus package adopted by the Chi-
nese government. In September 2008, after the outbreak of the global financial crisis, China’s
economic growth slowed down rapidly, with negative exports growth and a large number of
migrant workers returning home. The economy was at risk of a hard landing. In response
to this crisis, the State Council approved a plan to invest 4 trillion yuan in infrastructure and
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social welfare by the end of 2010. The Chinese government launched ten measures, for ex-
ample, providing funds for infrastructure projects and housing developments, in November
2008 to further expand domestic demand and promote steady and rapid economic growth.
According to preliminary calculations, the implementation of these ten measures would re-
quire an investment of about 4 trillion yuan by the end of 2010.
Accordingly, market factors, particularly equity ratios and risk buffers, significantly affect
joint-equity commercial banks, which are partly privatised, as well as systemically unimpor-
tant banks, which excludes the three largest state-owned commercial banks. To find large
state-owned commercial banks being less exposed to market forces is unsurprising, given
that they benefit from being too big to fail, and are more exposed to policy decisions rather
than market factors.
In terms of relative contribution of market and bureaucratic variables, the former tend
to be larger in size but are generally less significant, particularly for estimates of individual
banks. Here, a lack of efficiency given the lack of available data appears decisive. But given
the more efficient estimates for bank groups, we do find significant evidence for the impact
of market dynamics. Where significant, the effect of market factors again outsizes that of
bureaucratic variables by a large margin.
5.2.2.2 Baseline specific models Table 9 applies a further stepwise elimination of insignif-
icant variables as outlined before. This tackles the problem of efficiency that is present for
individual bank estimates and requires a more parsimonious approach. We apply the elimi-
nation to both, market and bureaucratic variables. Results nor indicate a more significant im-
pact of market variables, which is generally in line with previous results. Most privately cap-
italised banks increase lending given higher equity ratios and risk-buffers, whilst some cases
of state-owned commercial banks suggest the opposite. In particular for Bank of Communi-
cations, there is a significant negative effect of risk buffers and return on equity on lending
behaviour, which suggests lending decisions driven by policy considerations not commercial
factors.
Findings for bank groups validate previous results. Furthermore the coefficient on ETA(-
1) for city commercial banks is now significant, which reiterates the importance of market
factors for banks which has a relatively diverse ownership structure.
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Table 8: Baseline general specifications, coefficients. Dependent variable: NLG; Method: Panel Least Squares.
Regressors ETA(-1) GRRTTL(-1) ROE(-1) CTA(-1) C @SEAS(1) @SEAS(2) @SEAS(3) @TREND D9Q1 D9Q2 D9Q3 NLG(-1) DB511Q3 R2 MLL DW
Fixed Effects Panel:
14 banks 0.510*** 0.588* 0.131** 0.035 -0.020 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.006* -0.001*** 0.110*** 0.072*** 0.014** 0.320*** 0.037 0.66 1423.91 1.94
Individual banks (crossid, heterogeneous panel estimation):
1 -0.598 -0.042 0.029 -0.021 0.058 0.021*** 0.014 0.004 0.000 0.098*** 0.004 -0.005 0.028 0.91 153.58 2.04
2 -0.083 0.345 0.067 0.128 0.016 0.016*** 0.018 0.007 -0.001 0.086*** -0.008 0.000 0.120 0.92 155.46 1.99
3 -0.300 0.479 0.248 -0.143 0.002 0.032*** 0.029 0.013 0.000 0.126*** 0.100*** 0.058*** 0.181 0.89 128.98 2.54
4 -0.324 -2.936 -0.350 -0.300 0.152 0.048*** -0.005 0.002 0.000 0.161*** 0.082** 0.017 -0.338* 0.92 133.27 2.24
5 2.714** 4.048* 0.365 0.007 -0.166* -0.004 0.041 0.027 -0.003*** 0.150*** 0.054* 0.030 0.316*** -0.024 0.90 110.36 1.61
6 -1.096 1.583 0.049 0.080 0.060 -0.001 0.008 -0.013 0.000 0.152*** 0.003 -0.094*** 0.182 0.87 123.14 1.98
7 0.926 2.696 0.195 -0.119 -0.037 0.013 0.025 0.002 -0.002* 0.098*** 0.009 -0.015 -0.067 0.75 127.57 2.24
8 0.825 1.281 -0.157 0.134 -0.008 0.019* -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.077*** 0.204*** 0.008 -0.155 0.83 116.15 2.16
9 1.743 1.832 0.114 -0.086 -0.069 0.021** 0.018 0.018 -0.002*** 0.062*** 0.113*** -0.025 0.074 0.83 122.04 2.00
10 1.270 0.636 0.545** 0.578*** -0.194** -0.018 0.048*** 0.010 0.001 0.083*** 0.058** 0.068*** 0.222 0.78 118.05 1.69
11 -0.151 0.611 -0.194 -0.018 0.082 0.008 -0.011 -0.017 -0.001 0.211*** 0.146*** -0.028 -0.050 0.90 120.08 1.75
12 0.619 -1.095 0.221 0.029 -0.033 0.036*** 0.050** 0.017 0.000 0.058*** 0.080*** 0.037** -0.010 0.90 138.75 1.62
13 0.508 1.766 -0.236 0.249 -0.003 0.005 -0.020 -0.019 -0.001 0.201*** 0.032 -0.019 0.309 0.76 99.13 1.98
14 0.427 0.952 0.044 -0.038 0.021 0.014* 0.009 -0.004 -0.001 0.019 0.143*** 0.206*** -0.065 0.92 128.46 1.24
Mean 0.463 0.868 0.067 0.034 -0.009 0.015 0.016 0.003 -0.001 0.113 0.073 0.017 0.053 -0.024
Std. Dev. 1.006 1.654 0.245 0.207 0.092 0.017 0.022 0.013 0.001 0.056 0.064 0.068 0.184
Groups of banks (Fixed Effects):
SOCBs -0.078 -0.454 0.038 0.163** 0.017 0.030*** 0.013 0.005 0.000 0.106*** 0.024** 0.015* 0.123 0.80 492.32 2.02
JSCBs 0.869*** 0.885* 0.139** 0.053 -0.033* 0.007* 0.019*** 0.005 -0.001*** 0.121*** 0.091*** -0.009 0.320*** -0.032 0.70 719.04 2.01
CCBs 0.410 0.951 -0.069 0.006 0.011 0.021** 0.006 -0.004 -0.001 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.068*** 0.101 0.62 289.40 1.84
G-SIBs 0.293 0.500 0.050 0.213** -0.022 0.026*** 0.010 0.004 -0.001* 0.088*** 0.011 0.014 0.262*** 0.80 381.31 1.91
G-SUIBs 0.535*** 0.680* 0.130** 0.033 -0.018 0.013*** 0.020*** 0.005 -0.001*** 0.115*** 0.085*** 0.013 0.321*** 0.019 0.65 1086.85 1.95
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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Table 9: Baseline specific specifications, coefficients. Dependent variable: NLG; Method: Panel Least Squares.
Regressors ETA(-1) GRRTTL(-1) ROE(-1) CTA(-1) C @SEAS(1) @SEAS(2) @SEAS(3) @TREND D9Q1 D9Q2 D9Q3 NLG(-1) DB511Q3 R2 MLL DW
Fixed Effects Panel:
14 banks 0.510*** 0.588* 0.131** 0.035 -0.020 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.006* -0.001*** 0.110*** 0.072*** 0.014** 0.320*** 0.037 0.66 1423.91 1.94
Individual banks (crossid):
1 -0.685*** 0.068*** 0.021*** 0.010*** 0.097*** 0.90 155.01 1.92
2 0.211* 0.031*** 0.015*** 0.009*** -0.001*** 0.088*** 0.89 154.80 1.77
3 0.007* 0.039*** 0.113*** 0.084*** 0.045** 0.287*** 0.87 125.85 2.63
4 -2.545*** -0.181*** 0.079*** 0.044*** 0.150*** 0.028** 0.89 131.02 2.41
5 4.640** 0.000 -0.002** 0.072*** 0.317*** 0.86 106.98 1.87
6 -0.588** 0.068*** -0.013** 0.159*** -0.097*** 0.216*** 0.86 121.15 2.01
7 1.107** 4.082*** 0.319*** -0.124* -0.073** 0.031*** -0.002*** 0.106*** 0.73 128.85 2.25
8 -0.128* 0.050*** 0.022** 0.080*** 0.202*** -0.192** 0.81 112.96 2.06
9 1.774 1.900*** -0.051** 0.017*** -0.003*** 0.073*** 0.121*** 0.80 121.75 1.95
10 1.747*** 0.244*** 0.478*** -0.132*** 0.023** 0.097*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.74 117.99 1.39
11 0.038*** -0.015*** 0.224*** 0.147*** 0.88 119.89 1.90
12 -0.780*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.030*** 0.008** 0.069*** 0.085*** 0.037*** 0.88 140.29 1.75
13 0.810* 1.352* -0.052 0.197*** 0.347*** 0.73 96.93 2.13
14 0.609*** 0.006 0.017*** 0.144*** 0.192*** 0.90 126.89 1.59
Mean 0.598 1.441 0.063 0.189 0.006 0.024 0.021 -0.007 -0.002 0.117 0.110 0.049 0.164 0.317
Std. Dev. 0.957 2.766 0.255 0.302 0.067 0.014 0.011 0.013 0.001 0.050 0.054 0.103 0.244
Groups of banks (Fixed Effects):
SOCBs 0.191** 0.014** 0.029*** 0.007** 0.000*** 0.103*** 0.018 0.015* 0.162** 0.79 490.97 2.05
JSCBs 0.827*** 0.966** 0.116** -0.023* 0.007* 0.016*** -0.001*** 0.120*** 0.084*** 0.323*** 0.69 734.84 2.06
CCBs 0.331* 0.019 0.020*** 0.012** 0.100*** 0.110*** 0.082*** 0.60 294.67 1.65
G-SIBs 0.206*** 0.006 0.027*** 0.000*** 0.090*** 0.370*** 0.78 377.68 2.15
G-SUIBs 0.435*** 0.647* 0.114* 0.033 -0.009 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.004 -0.001*** 0.116*** 0.086*** 0.014* 0.321*** 0.65 1113.80 1.91
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
24
6 Conclusion
We study Chinese bank lending for a panel of 14 Chinese banks over the decade following
the global financial crisis. In doing so, we investigate the degree to which bank lending is
driven by economic factors or a set of bureaucratic, deterministic variables. We find sig-
nificant effects on bank lending through both economic and bureaucratic variables, based
on pooled fixed-effects estimates. The impact of economic factors is less significant in het-
erogeneous panels. This suggests significant exposure of joint-equity banks and global sys-
temically unimportant banks to market forces. Bank lending through systemically relevant
and state-owned commercial Chinese banks hence appears to be rather driven by policy and
"too-big-to-fail" effects than commercial considerations.
These results suggest that, whilst there remains a large degree of state influence on Chi-
nese banks, there is evidence for market exposure even at a time of unprecedented state in-
terventions following the global financial crisis. Using new data that allows exploring the het-
erogeneity of the Chinese banking system, we thus find crucial evidence for the development
of the Chinese banking system into a market economy. Further promising research could at-
tempt to compare the results on bank specific factors with that for US banks, to compare the
degree to which market factors affected bank lending in a developed market economy post
2008. It will also be interesting to see if the pattern of bank lending remains the same in the
future if Chinese growth is slower.
This research is a starting-point towards evaluating Chinese financial development. It
will be interesting to investigate this from a macroeconomic perspective, analysing how the
interaction of key macro-economic aggregates resembles aggregate goods and money supply
and demand relationships.
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A Appendix: Patterns of bank-specific variables
Figure 3: NLTTA: Ratio of Net Loans and Receivables to Total Assets.
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Note: The number at top of each subgraph corresponds to the crossid of each bank listed in Table 1.
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Figure 4: ETA: Ratio of Equity to Assets.
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Note: The number at top of each subgraph corresponds to the crossid of each bank listed in Table 1.
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Figure 5: GRRTTL: Ratio of General Risk Reserves to sum of General Risk Reserves and Net Loans And
Receivables.
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Note: The number at top of each subgraph corresponds to the crossid of each bank listed in Table 1.
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Figure 6: NPTEMP: Net Profits per Employee.
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Note: The number at top of each subgraph corresponds to the crossid of each bank listed in Table 1.
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Figure 7: ROE: Return on Equity.
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Note: The number at top of each subgraph corresponds to the crossid of each bank listed in Table 1.
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Figure 8: CTA: Ratio of Cash to Assets.
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Note: The number at top of each subgraph corresponds to the crossid of each bank listed in Table 1.
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Figure 9: DCTTA: Deposits Due To Customers to Total Assets.
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Note: The number at top of each subgraph corresponds to the crossid of each bank listed in Table 1.
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Figure 10: BS: Bank size.
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Note: The number at top of each subgraph corresponds to the crossid of each bank listed in Table 1.
B Appendix: Diagnostics of baseline general specifications
Table 10 shows three diagnostic tests for the baseline general specifications including redun-
dant variable test, ommitted variable test, and residual normality test.
The first column gives the P values for a F test of the joint significance of the economic
variables in the baseline general model. The null hypothesis is that ETA(-1), GRRTTL(-1),
ROE(-1), and CTA(-1) are jointly insignificant. For the individual banks, the economic vari-
ables are only significant at the 5% level in Bank 10, the Industrial Bank Co., Ltd. and at the
10% level in 4 banks. For 10 of the 14 banks the economic variables are not significant. They
are significant in pooled groups: JSCBs (joint-equity banks). They are also significant when
the 14 banks are pooled using the fixed effect estimator, probably because the larger sample
size has reduced the standard errors.
We have assumed one lag of the economic variables in the baseline general model. The
second column gives the P values for a F test for adding a second lag. The null hypothesis
is that ETA(-2), GRRTTL(-2), ROE(-2), and CTA(-2) are jointly significant. The second lag is
significant at the 5% level only in 2 banks: the bank 1 and 12, and at the 10% level in the bank
3. Among the groups it is significant at the 1% level in G-SIBs and 10% level in group SOCBs.
Thus there is relatively little evidence to include a second lag of economic variables in the
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model. This is also evidence against second order serial correlation being important.
The third column gives P values for normality tests. Only 2 of the 14 banks fail the nor-
mality test but the heterogeneity among the banks means that all the groups and the pooled
estimates fail the normality test. These tests suggest that our general specifications for the
individual banks are reliable.
Table 10: Baseline general specifications, diagnostic tests. Dependent variable: NLG.
Test Redundant variables test Omitted variable test Residual normality test
F-statistic P-value P-value P-value
Fixed Effects Panel
14 banks 0.000 0.608 0.000
Individual banks (crossid)
1 0.737 0.012 0.272
2 0.756 0.338 0.260
3 0.707 0.079 0.766
4 0.071 0.130 0.111
5 0.065 0.310 0.000
6 0.351 0.891 0.933
7 0.412 0.103 0.544
8 0.409 0.300 0.152
9 0.070 0.824 0.880
10 0.001 0.297 0.728
11 0.907 0.276 0.964
12 0.341 0.022 0.856
13 0.756 0.957 0.000
14 0.607 0.379 0.286
Groups of banks (Fixed Effects)
SOCBs 0.168 0.058 0.000
JSCBs 0.000 0.472 0.000
CCBs 0.450 0.210 0.000
G-SIBs 0.115 0.003 0.000
G-SUIBs 0.001 0.508 0.000
Note: The bold green numbers denotes significance at the 10% level; the bold blue numbers at the 5%
level; and the bold red numbers at the 1% level.
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